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E-mail address: levi@columbia.eduAccording to Henry Kyburg, all extralogical and extramathematical propositions accepted
as evidence and all propositions accepted inductively on the basis of such evidence are
uncertain. There is a possibility of error. Consequently, neither the corpus of inductively
accepted statements nor the corpus of statements accepted as evidence can serve as a stan-
dard for serious possibility in the sense I have deployed since the 1970s. The standard for
serious possibility remains an unchanging Parmenidean standard. In contrast to other Par-
menidean epistemologists that eschew inductive acceptances Kyburg insists that the cor-
pus of evidence and of inductively accepted statements is subject to critical review and
change; but the changes have no bearing on the standard for serious possibility.
I have always agreed with Henry’s emphasis on a distinction between acceptance as evi-
dence and inductive acceptance. But I have insisted that the corpus of evidence or state of
full belief is a standard for serious possibility and that the standard is subject to modiﬁca-
tion.
Kyburg does think of acceptance as evidence and inductive acceptance as modal notions
and has recently used the expression ‘‘serious possibility’’ in this connection. But when
Kyburg and Teng speak of ‘‘risky knowledge’’, they are speaking of claims that might be
false in the sense of serious possibility that they seem to be suggesting is immune to
change and seems to correlate with serious possibility as I have used it since the 1970s.
So acceptance (both inductive and evidential) are modal notions subject to change but
are not to be confused with the notion of serious possibility of error or riskiness.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.According to Henry Kyburg, we support the uncertain by the less uncertain. In saying so, he stood opposed to the
Popperian falsiﬁcationism and the Carnapian and Jeffrey like probabilism that became fashionable during the period when
he and I participated in philosophical discussion.
He insisted that in science, some theories and laws are so well established that we may take them as settled and that the
‘‘data’’ produced in scientiﬁc inquiry are often obtained with sufﬁcient reliability to warrant our accepting them as evidence.
We have already introduced the idea of distinguishing between a body of evidential certainties and a body of practical
certainties. Statements enter the latter body by having a probability of at least 1  e, say relative to the evidence in
the evidential corpus. The contents of the evidential corpus is not up for dispute. It is what the participants in the discus-
sion of the practical corpus take for granted. But objectivity is preserved in the following way: if some item of evidence is
disputed, we can examine the evidence for it in turn. What this comes to is treating the evidential corpus as a body of
practical certainties of level 1  e/2 and considering the body of evidence that supports item in that corpus of level
1  e/2 (Kyburg and Teng [6, p. 272]).. All rights reserved.
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tance for the purpose of refuting testworthy conjectures. He rejected also the views of those like Carnap who advocated rep-
resenting the fruits of inquiry by expressions of how well hypotheses are supported by evidence in the sense that their
probabilities are increased by the evidence. And he stood opposed to radical probabilism of R.C. Jeffrey that would root
out all representations of the results of inquiry in terms of belief, certainty, acceptance and the like in favor of reports of
degrees of credal probability. In spite of their differences, Popper, Carnap and Jeffrey argued against accepting hypotheses
on the basis of evidence that does not entail the hypotheses. In this respect, they were all anti inductivists.
I agree with Henry’s insistence on the importance of inductive acceptance just as I follow him in insisting that principles
of rational probability judgment should permit agents to endorse states of credal probability that are not representable by
uniquely permissible probability functions. We are both inductivists and we both hold that probability judgment should be
allowed to be indeterminate.
Even so, there is an important respect in which Henry’s inductivism and mine diverge. For me, inductive inference when
implemented by the inquirer is one way of changing the inquirer’s standard for serious possibility. To accept a hypothesis H
by induction is one way of coming to fully believe or to be certain that H. Prior to such acceptance, the inquirer’s evidence
commits him or her to a standard for serious possibility K and the truth of all its consequences.
Commitment to K rules out the logical possibility that any candidate object of belief incompatible with K is true as a seri-
ous possibility. Commitment to K precludes any ‘‘real and living doubt’’ concerning the truth of K. Here then is one difference
between Henry’s inductivism and mine. On my view, what Henry sometimes called the corpus of evidence contains no
uncertainty – at least, when the inquirer is living up to his or her commitments. On Henry’s view, uncertainty is never com-
pletely eradicated. There is always a possibility and, in general, a positive probability that the evidence is false.
Kyburg and I agree, of course, that the negation of H (‘‘conclusion’’ of the induction that is supported by K), however, is
consistent with K. (The inference is not deductive) Even though H is also consistent with K, prior to inductive expansion of K,
H is subject to question and doubt. It is judged possibly false and possibly true. H is ‘‘accepted’’ inductively in the weak sense
according to which the available evidence K evaluates H as the best conjecture supported by K.
I maintain that H is recommended for acceptance into the evidential corpus. But it is not qua recommended added to the
evidential corpus or state of full belief. Only if the recommendation is obeyed is the status of H as a conjecture that is pos-
sibly false changed to that of a full belief that is certainly true. There is, to be sure, risk incurred in undertaking this change;
but once it is taken, from the inquirer’s new point of view, there is no risk of error in fully believing that H. The inquirer has
obtained knowledge that is not risky.
On my view, implementing the recommendation is undertaking a commitment to fully believe, be certain and accept as
evidence that H is true. In so doing, the inquirer undertakes a commitment to ruling the falsity of H out as a serious possi-
bility. The standard for serious possibility – i.e. the distinction between serious possibilities consistent with full belief and
impossibilities inconsistent with full belief has been modiﬁed.
Henry does not see matters in this way. He distinguishes between the evidential corpus K and conjecture H in the corpus
of conjectures (practical corpus) supported by induction from K. However, H is not recommended for acceptance into the
evidential corpus. It is acceptable in the ‘‘practical’’ corpus. Both K and H are risky. Kmay be less risky than H but it remains
risky. I understand this to mean that the falsity of both K and H is seriously possible – that is to say, consistent with the
inquirer’s state of full belief [3].
Of course, relative to K, K is not possibly false. But the ‘‘knowledge’’ represented by K is nonetheless risky according to
Kyburg and Teng. So while the inquirer endorses K in the evidential corpus, he acknowledges what I call a serious possibility
that K is false. Kyburg would not call this possibility ‘‘serious possibility’’. Even so, it is serious enough to qualify the ‘‘knowl-
edge’’ contained in the evidential corpus as ‘‘risky’’. It corresponds to what I have called ‘‘serious possibility’’ since the early
1970s. I shall continue to employ my usage.
One implication of Kyburg’s view is that ‘‘risky knowledge’’ K cannot be a constituent of a standard for serious possibility.
Even though Kyburg can and does provide for changes in the evidential corpus (and the practical corpus as well), such
changes are not changes in the standard for serious possibility.1
Henry insisted that both the evidential corpus K and the practical corpus obtained by adding those hypotheses whose
probabilities are above an acceptable threshold are ‘‘uncertain’’. On my view, according to inquirer X prior to induction, there
is no serious possibility that any consequence of K is false. Items added to K to form the practical corpus might be false – or
so Henry and I both suggest as long as the contents of the practical corpus are not added to the evidential corpus.
As I understand inductive argument, inductive argument is used to justify or support expanding the standard for serious
possibility. The inquirer thereby becomes committed to being certain that H and all the consequences of H and K are true1 In a recent publications where Cho Man Teng and Kyburg [6] have been emphasizing ‘‘Risky Knowledge’’, the focus of attention has been on ‘‘the set of
conclusions that may be obtained via nonmonotonic or inductive inference from a body of evidence’’ where both the set of conclusions and the evidence are
allegedly risky. They deploy the resources of a so called minimal modal logic along the lines of Dana Scott where risky knowledge is a necessity operator. The
dual of this operator is a possibility operator. It is shown that the modal structure obtained does not embrace the rule of adjunction. It must be emphasized that
the possibility operator does not represent serious possibility in the sense in which the riskiness of knowledge implies the serious possibility that it is false.
Kyburg and Teng insist that all knowledge is risky and uncertain except, perhaps, logical and mathematical truth. For Kyburg and Teng, such absolute and
riskless knowledge is expressed by statements contained in every set of evidential statements. P. 255) Knowledge is ‘risky’ just in case its lower probability is
above a given threshold and it is extralogical and extramathematical. Whether the threshold condition is satisﬁed is relevant to whether the inquirer has
knowledge but not to whether risk is incurred.
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standard for serious possibility.
The upshot is this: Henry insists explicitly that both the evidential corpus and practical corpus are uncertain or risky. That
is to say, members of both corpora are possibly false. But according to the neighborhood semantics Kyburg and Cheng de-
ploy, no element of the evidential corpus is possibly false. The same is truemutatis mutandis for the practical corpus. A char-
itable interpretation of what Kyburg and Teng maintain is that the elements of the evidential (practical) corpus are risky and,
hence, possibly false in the sense of serious possibility.
I insist that inquirer X is committed to ruling out the serious possibility that elements of the corpus of evidence are false. I
agree that elements of the practical corpus might be false as long as the recommendations of induction are not implemented.
According to Henry, inquirers ought always to acknowledge such a real and living doubt concerning their evidence K.
While acknowledging such doubt, when they use K as the evidence to infer some inductive conclusion H to be added to K,
the ‘‘acceptance’’ of H requires that relative to K, H be judged probable to a sufﬁciently high degree (more accurately that the
lower probability of the interval that represents the inquirer’s judgment as to the probability that H relative to K ought to be
above some threshold). Thus, in the context in which K is the ‘‘evidential corpus’’, the ‘‘practical corpus’’ consists of K and all
hypotheses whose lower probabilities relative to K are above the threshold.
According to Henry, all evidential certainties are possibly false as are all practical certainties. In making an inductive infer-
ence, the inquirer does not modify in any way the distinction between serious possibilities and impossibilities. Indeed, for
Henry the set of serious possibilities (in the sense of Enterprise of Knowledge) coincides with the set of logical possibilities.
In this respect, Kyburg’s epistemology is in agreement with the views of Popper, Carnap and Jeffrey all of whom seem
committed to a ‘‘Parmenidean’’ epistemology. According to Parmenidean epistemology, the distinction between candidates
for belief that are possibly true and candidates whose truth is ruled out as impossible never changes. The sense of ‘possibility’
is to be understood is consistency with the inquirer’s state of full belief.2
All good Parmenideans do recognize change of some kind or another (even if it is only an ‘apparent’ change). The Poppe-
rians recognize a distinction between what is corroborated and what is not, Carnapians between what is well conﬁrmed and
what is not and the followers of Jeffrey acknowledge variations in judgments of credal probability in response to sensory
stimulation. Although these views differ concerning what it is that varies, they all insist that there should be no change
in the distinction between serious possibility and impossibility, or absolute certainty and failure of absolute certainty.
My ambition has been to develop an account of inquiry according to which the distinction between serious possibility and
impossibility is subject to critical scrutiny and modiﬁcation. On this view, X may at one time be absolutely certain that H (so
that H is seriously possible according to X at that time while H is not) and yet be justiﬁed in changing this judgment sub-
sequently. Epistemology ought to be concerned with the conditions under which an inquirer is justiﬁed in changing the
boundaries between the possible and the impossible.
For the inquirer X to change the boundaries between the possible and impossible is on this viewmodifying X’s state of full
belief or evidential corpus. That evidential corpus should on this view be closed under deductive consequence. Thus, on my
view, the evidential corpus (state of full belief) serves a distinctive and important function. It is, as I have maintained for the
last four decades, the inquirer’s standard for serious possibility. Of course, in that capacity it serves also as the inquirer’s
background information, evidence and reservoir of error-free information.
Kyburg, by way of contrast, took the evidential corpus to be uncertain in the sense that it contains information that is
highly probable but not absolutely certain. This implies that the evidential corpus is not closed under deductive conse-
quence. Although the evidential corpus provides the premises or evidence used to support inductive inferences as it does
for me and is subject to modiﬁcation as it is for me, no change in the distinction between what is seriously possible and what
is not is countenanced or even considered.
I did not succeed in persuading Henry of the cogency of my understanding of full belief while he was alive. Indeed, when
Henry discussed the idea he tended to quote my earlier self against my later self by citing ideas I had advanced in the 1960’s
in Gambling with Truth [7] and my collaboration with Sidney Morgenbesser ‘‘Belief and Disposition’’ [10]. In those essays, I
had not extricated myself from the ideas of Parmenidean epistemology. I had not as yet come to the view that inquirer X’s
state of full belief served as X’s standard for serious possibility. I did, to be sure, hold that X’s full beliefs constituted X’s evi-
dential corpus. But I characterized the evidence in terms of the consensus concerning its status rather than in terms of its
function in inquiry.
In short, evidence will consist of those of the investigator’s beliefs that are relevant to the problem at hand and are not
likely to be questioned by any party to the inquiry [7, p. 4].
What counts as evidence is that which is not subject to serious question or recognized to be so subject by anyone whom
the investigator might wish to convince of the propriety of his conclusions. Evidence in this sense need not be evident or2 As already noted in footnote 1, in recent years, Kyburg and Teng [6] have appeared to articulate a view different than this. Utilizing the resources of
‘‘neighborhood semantics’’, a modal logic according to which ‘necessity’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘full belief’ carries probability above a speciﬁc threshold. When a
conjunction carries such high probability, it distributes over the conjuncts that are its constituents. The converse of this claim fails. One can of course deﬁne a
notion of possibility that is dual to this notion of carrying high probability. But possibility so deﬁned is not serious possibility as I have conceived it since the
1970s. And riskiness of knowledge cannot be explicated in terms of possibility of error in the neighborhood semantic sense. Kyburg’s evidential corpus can, of
course, change. My point is that on his view, such change does not bring in its wake a change in the distinction between the risky and the riskless or the possibly
false and the not possibly false.
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some question no previously considered legitimate (perhaps not considered at all). What is evidential is accepted as true
with great conﬁdence relative to all the questions we care to raise. Perhaps some criterion of the legitimacy of questions is
available although this is doubtful. But such a criterion is unnecessary for the purpose of characterizing evidence in efforts
at local justiﬁcation [7, p. 151].
In Gambling with Truth I insisted that not only should the evidential corpus be closed under logical consequence; but so
should the set of sentences accepted via induction from that evidence. I have not changed my views about these points in
subsequent work. However, when writing that essay, I did not or did not clearly understand induction to be a modiﬁcation of
the inquirer’s standard for serious possibility. I contended that accepting H as evidence is being certain that H is true. But
that certainty amounted to acceptability relative to all questions the inquirer cared to raise.3 I suggested that once H is ac-
cepted as evidence, it is pointless to inquire further concerning its truth unless new questions are taken seriously. Hence, my
characterization remained open to the charge leveled by Kyburg among others that my account of acceptance as evidence (and
acceptance as true) was guided by considerations quite similar to those he favored.
Thus, according to Henry, the evidential corpus is a set of claims carrying probability above a threshold higher than the
threshold for practical certainties (but short of 1). ‘‘Disagreement about premises, in turn, can be resolved by retreating to a
level at which all relevant evidence can be shared. That there is such a level is what objectivity in science comes to’’ [5].
Although the epistemological stance I took in writing Gambling with Truth differed from Kyburg’s in many respects, I
agreed with him that justiﬁcation of change in belief – even of local justiﬁcation was not justifying changes in standards
for serious possibility. Like Kyburg, I was concerned with justifying acceptance of evidence and changes in the evidential cor-
pus and, as noted before, there was some similarity in the way we understood the status of what is accepted as evidence
even if we differed concerning his endorsement of a high probability criterion for evidential acceptance. Like Henry, I rec-
ognized that what is accepted as evidence could be challenged. I proposed a decision theoretic approach to induction that
I hoped could meet the challenge of creeping skepticism. I eventually came to the conclusion that the project I had under-
taken would not work unless standards for serious possibility were recognized to be subject to critical review and
modiﬁcation.
By 1970, I had come around to the position expressed in the following passage (speaking of a corpus of knowledge rather
than a corpus of evidence, certainties or full belief).4
The doctrine of infallibilism I espouse is a consequence of a conception of the way a corpus of knowledge should be used
for inquiry and deliberation. We are not concerned merely to afﬁrm our beliefs upon interrogation. Our beliefs guide our
conduct by furnishing a criterion for distinguishing between logical possibilities which are serious and logical possibilities
which for all practical and theoretical purposes may be utterly ignored’’ [9, p. 154].
In 1970, I ﬁnally became persuaded that I should think of the evidential corpus (a set of sentences) as a linguistic repre-
sentative of a state of full belief understood as a standard for serious possibility. Let K be the algebra of potential states of full
belief. K is the member of K representing X’s state of full belief at a given time or in a given context. H is a serious possibility
according to X’s state of full belief K if and only if H is consistent with K within the algebra K. X is committed to full belief
that G for every G that is a consequence of K in the algebra.
A conditional probability P(x/y) relative to a state of full belief K takes as arguments for the variable x all members of the
algebra K and for the variable y all members of K consistent with a designated state K of full belief. In the applications of
interest here, K is the inquirer’s state of full belief and the range of values allowable for y are elements of K consistent with
K understood as serious possibilities.5
Thus, the standard for serious possibility serves to deﬁne the space of serious possibilities over which rational inquirer’s
state of credal probability is deﬁned. Without a standard for serious possibility, the credal probability is not coherently
deﬁnable.63 Judging that H is certainly true could not be equated with judging it maximally probable so that H carried probability 1. The mean, median and mode of a
normally distributed random variable carries probability 0. It would be a mistake, however, to be certain for this reason that on an experiment, the outcome
will not be that value because the probability that it will not be is 1.
4 The citation is from ‘‘Truth, Fallibility and the Growth of Knowledge’’, a paper I delivered as a lecture at the University of Pittsburgh, Rockefeller University,
Michigan and other locations in 1970 and 1971. I presented it at the Boston Colloquium in 1975. Robert Cohen and Marx Wartofsky published in Language, Logic
and Method Dordrecht: Reidel (1983), 153–174. By that time, the same material had appeared in the ﬁrst three chapters of Enterprise of Knowledge, Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press (1980).
5 This is the view I adopted in Arló Costa [1] and Levi [8, 4.2].
6 Bas van Fraassen [12] and Arló Costa and Parikh [2] among others have taken conditional probability P(x/y) to be well deﬁned for every pair of propositions
hx,yi by stipulating that P(x/y) = 1 for all values of x when y is ‘abnormal’. When y is normal, P(x/y) ranging over the domain of x satisfy the conditions for a
probability measure. In this they take their cue from Popper [11] (Appendices (ii) and (iv)). These authors have sought to derive a concept of full belief from the
structural features of conditional probabilities so represented-at least for cases where the domain of propositions is generated by countably many atoms and
countable additivity is satisﬁed. In cases where conditional probabilities determine a nested ‘system of cores’utilizing the notion of superiority, van Fraassen
equates the full beliefs with the innermost core. Arló Costa and Parikh argue for the outermost core. It is unclear that either proposal for a conception of full
belief deﬁnes a notion of serious possibility that coincides with the conception of normality. Whatever interest their notions of abnormality, superiority and
belief cores may have, they need to show that the notion of full belief they deploy deﬁnes a notion of serious possibility (consistency with full belief) that
restricts the normal propositions to the serious possibilities if they are to obtain a characterization of full belief and serious possibility in terms of conditional
probability. As far as I can tell, they have not succeeded.
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state as numerically determinate or as indeterminate so that it is representable by a set of permissible conditional probabil-
ities relative to K, in order to derive a credal state we need to invoke both a state K of full belief and what I call a conﬁrma-
tional commitment which is a function from the domain of potential states of full belief to sets of credal states relative to K.7
Changes in credal state are thus a function of changes in states of full belief and conﬁrmational commitments.
X is not committed to retaining the same standard for serious possibility forever. Conditions can arise where X may be
justiﬁed in modifying X’s standard for serious possibility. In that case, I say X is warranted in changing his state of full belief
or corpus of evidence. Kyburg allowed for changes in the corpus of evidence; but he denied that the corpus is a standard for
serious possibility. He was a Parmenidean. He acknowledged that X’s evidential corpus can change; but denied that it serves
as a standard for serious possibility.
By way of contrast I concluded that ‘‘acceptance as evidence’’ should be morphed into an attitude of full belief which an
inquirer could coherently adopt as his or her standard for serious possibility (and absolute certainty) while acknowledging
the serious possibility that the inquirer fully believes what he or she currently fully believes could legitimately be given up in
subsequent inquiry.
The distinction between evidential certainty and practical certainty could also be clariﬁed. In a context where the inquirer
X seeks to expand X’s state of full belief from an initial state K (corresponding to the evidential corpus) by inference, X is
committed to recognizing a range of potential or relevant answers to the question X seeks to answer. I have suggested rep-
resenting these potential answers by subsets of a set UK (the ultimate partition relative to K) of hypotheses where K entails
that exactly one element of UK is true and each element of UK is consistent with K. A potential answer recommends rejection
all elements of a subset R of UK or equivalently expanding K by adding the join of the unrejected elements of UK – i.e., the join
of {UK/R}-and the logical consequence of this join and K.
According to the proposal I formulated in ‘‘Information and Inference’’ [9], an element x of the ultimate partition is re-
jected if and only if its credal probability QK(x) falls below a certain threshold. That threshold is determined by undamped
informational value of x and an index of boldness q. This formulation is a generalization of and improvement upon the pro-
posal in Gambling with Truth. In subsequent work in the 1970s and 1980s, the proposals were generalized to address cases
where credal states and assessments of the value of information go indeterminate.
According to all these versions, the expansion recommended by the evidence remains possibly false as long as the rec-
ommended expansion is not adopted. But once it is adopted, the corpus of inductive acceptances becomes the new evidential
corpus. The inquirer is committed to judging these acceptances to be absolute certainties.
There are two important respects in which my proposal differs from Henry’s. (I ignore cases where probability goes inde-
terminate even though I agree with Henry that such cases are by far the most important.)
According to Henry, a proposition H is accepted via induction from K if and only if its probability reaches a speciﬁed level.
According to my proposal, an element x of the ultimate proposition is rejected if and only if its probability is below a thresh-
old determined by the informational value of x and the index of boldness. A join of elements of UK is rejected just in case all
elements of UK in the join are rejected. The join of all unrejected elements of UK and deductive consequences of this prop-
osition and K are accepted into the inductive corpus.
In contrast to Kyburg’s approach, there is no probability or lower probability that is a threshold for acceptance. There is a
threshold for rejecting elements of an ultimate partition that serves as a determiner of the relevant potential answers to the
question under investigation. This threshold is a function of probability as well as informational value and boldness. Henry
did concede that this criterion satisﬁes closure and consistency as long as only one ultimate partition is ‘‘detached’’. But he
pointed out that in Gambling with Truth (pp. 94–95), I had conceded that one might envisage cases where an enquirer de-
taches two or more ultimate partitions so that the inductive rejection and acceptance rules generate a set of deductively con-
sistent and closed corpora whose union fails to be closed and consistent. He wondered why this failure of consistency and
closure was any better than the failures resulting from his system. And if the failures are acceptable according to my system,
why not according to his? (Kyburg [4, p. 244].)
I believe a response is available using the resources of Gambling with Truth. According to Gambling with Truth, H is not
acceptable as evidence unless it is accepted according to every ultimate partition representing a seriously raised question.
Thus, in the case of the n-ticket fair lottery where every partition of the set of n tickets is taken to represent a seriously raised
question, there is no proposition other than the claim that some ticket will be selected that is accepted via induction accord-
ing to every seriously raised question.
Consider, however, a case where ticket 1 carries probability 0.999 and the remaining probability is divided between the
other tickets. Here too there will be seriously raised questions relative to which the hypothesis that ticket 1 will win will not
be accepted into evidence even though the inquirer sets q = 1. By 1970 and in later publications, I was insisting that an
inquirer should be using exactly one ultimate partition in seeking to add new information to his state of full belief. If an7 Credal probability, whether determinate or indeterminate, is best understood as derivable from (a) a state of full belief and (b) a conﬁrmational
commitment or generalized credibility function [8]. The reason is that states of full belief and conﬁrmational commitments should be understood to be two
independent determinants of credal probability. Change in credal probability is then understood to be a manifestation of change in state of full belief with
conﬁrmational commitment kept ﬁxed, change in conﬁrmational commitment with state of full belief kept ﬁxed or change in both components. If credal
probability is the component taken as primitive, as van Fraassen or Arló Cos ta and Par ikh propose (see note 4), these three alternatives cannot be recognized
very easily.
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coarsest common reﬁnement as the appropriate ultimate partition [9, ch. 7]. The reason for taking this view is that I took the
state of full belief to be the standard for serious possibility. If such a standard is to be changed, the change should be
unequivocal – or so I think.
This manner of thinking is not available to subscribers to Parmenidean epistemology.
Parmenideans face other obstacles. If standards for serious possibility and conﬁrmational commitments remain immune
to revision as Parmenideans require, either states of credal probability judgment cannot be derived from states of full belief
via conﬁrmational commitments or states of credal probability judgment should remain ﬁxed.
Yet, Bayesian and anti Bayesian Parmenideans alike wish to allow for modiﬁcation of credal probability judgment. Henry
allowed for modiﬁcation of evidential corpora via measurement and observation. But the evidential corpus fails to serve as a
standard for serious possibility. It cannot because the standard cannot change even though the evidential corpus does. Henry
recognized that changes in the evidential corpus supported changes in probability judgment and the corpus of uncertainties
but not changes in the distinction between serious possibility and impossibility.
Here then is the conundrum facing those who insist that standards for serious possibility and conﬁrmational commit-
ments ought never to change even though evidential corpora do change. If changes in evidential corpora do not control
changes in standards for serious possibility, what is the point of inductive acceptance.
I had already contended in Gambling with Truth that inductive acceptance is targeted at ‘‘replacing agnosticism by true
belief’’ I contended that the legitimacy of inductive inference from evidence E must be relative not only to the evidential
corpus but also to a given body of relevant answers to the question under investigation [7, p. 41]. But until I came to under-
stand changes in evidential corpora (i.e., states of full belief) to be changes in standards for serious possibility, I lacked a sat-
isfactory account of the importance of justifying such changes. This applied to expansions of evidential corpora by routines
that consult observation or reliable testimony, to inductive expansions and contractions.
Henry and I shared the notion that the evidential corpus should be relevant to determining the probability judgments that
ought to be endorsed. Henry remained, however, committed to Parmenidean epistemology. The evidential corpus could not
be absolutely certain and yet revisable. Henry was what would often be called a ‘‘fallibilist’’. That is, after all what Henry’s
brand of Parmenideanism amounts to.
In the 1970’s, I introduced a distinction between fallibilism and corrigibilism. Fallibilism is the view that from X’s point of
view X’s full beliefs (or certainties or evidential beliefs or knowledge) might be false and corrigibilism is the view that from
X’s point of view X’s full beliefs might in the future be legitimately modiﬁed or the other way around. I am not wedded to the
terminology I use to make the distinction. It is the distinction that matters. It is a distinction that advocates of the rejection of
Parmenidean epistemology who explore the topic of conditions under which standards for serious possibility may justiﬁably
be altered may coherently turn.
In recent years, Henry did occasionally introduce the expression ‘‘serious possibility’’ and claim, counter to what I have
said throughout this essay, that the distinction between serious possibility and impossibility is subject to criticism and re-
view. But it is equally clear that whatever he may have meant on those occasions in which he used the notion of serious
possibility, he did not mean serious possibility in the sense of consistency with the inquirer’s state of full belief. For example,
in the context of measurement for purpose of quality control, he clearly thought of serious possibility as probability of mea-
surement error sufﬁciently large so as to escape rejection. In the past few years, this idea has been given formal expression in
modal structures based on neighborhood semantics where the rule of adjunction fails. Serious possibility, as I understand it,
is inconsistency with the state of full belief. A state of full belief is closed under consequence in the algebra of potential states
of full belief. To use serious possibility and state of full belief within the framework of neighborhood semantics where such
closure is not assumed is to change the subject.
Although I have profound admiration for Henry’s technical skills, I was most impressed with his epistemological outlook
early on. I admired his scholarship, his skepticism concerning the various brands of Bayesianism that have been a glut on the
market for the past half century and his persistence in attempting to clarify an intriguing version of ﬁducial argument as key
to inductive inference. But above all, Henry’s ideas were a major source of inspiration for me in working out my own ideas. In
this essay, I sought to sketch some of the ways his Parmenideanism nudged me in the direction I have taken. He would have
refused to follow me but I doubt whether I would have found my path without Henry’s persistence in pursuing another
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